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Furthering Substantive Equality 
Through Administrative Law: 
Charter Values in Education 
Angela Cameron* and Paul Daly** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent decisions in the realm of Canadian public law have opened 
the door to Charter1 values. Administrative decision-makers must have 
regard to these values when making decisions. Through the use of a fic-
tional example, outlined below, this paper is intended provide a guide for 
laypersons, lawyers, judges, administrators, arbitrators and academics on 
how to further substantive equality through administrative law. Our focus 
in this paper is on education law, but the framework we propose is capa-
ble of application across a wide range of areas.2 
Two Supreme Court of Canada decisions from 2012 inspire our 
analytical framework. The first is Doré v. Barreau du Québec,3 in which 
Abella J. gave the following guidance to administrative decision-makers 
on how to exercise their powers in conformity with the values of the 
Charter: 
How then does an administrative decision-maker apply Charter values 
in the exercise of statutory discretion? He or she balances the Charter 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. 
I would like to thank Borden Ladner Gervais LLP for its support of this project through their BLG 
Research Fellowship program. I would also like to thank my research assistants Collin Fletcher and 
James Anderson for their invaluable assistance. 
** Professeur Adjoint, Faculté de Droit, Université de Montréal. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 The principles outlined here extend beyond their application to this particular example. 
Other factual circumstances might include: immigration and refugee boards, professional bodies, 
decisions made within the prison system and in the area of human rights law. 
3 [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”]. 
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values with the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing, the 
decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives … 
Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue will 
best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is at the core 
of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to 
balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with 
the statutory objectives.4  
The second is L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes,5 where the 
Court was faced with a challenge to a refusal to exempt schoolchildren 
from a government-mandated program on religion. This program did not 
seek to privilege any particular religious world view, but sought rather to 
privilege neutrality, to which the religiously observant applicant parents 
objected. The Court held that no interference with the applicants’ Charter 
rights had been established. Moreover, both Deschamps J., for the 
majority, and LeBel J., in his concurring reasons, took care to recall the 
important role schools play in Canadian society. As Deschamps J. 
commented: 
Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their children if they 
so wish. However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ 
from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in 
society. The suggestion that exposing children to a variety of religious 
facts in itself infringes their religious freedom or that of their parents 
amounts to a rejection of the multicultural reality of Canadian society 
and ignores the Quebec government’s obligations with regard to public 
education.6  
Difference and tolerance, then, are facts of Canadian life, to which 
children in the public school system should be exposed. Justice LeBel’s 
sentiments were similar: “[T]he very nature of a public education system 
implies the creation of opportunities for students of different origins and 
religions to learn about the diversity of opinions and cultures existing in 
our society, even in religious matters.”7  
The obligation to educate children about a “diversity of opinions and 
cultures” is at the heart of our exploration of administrative decision-
making in the education system. We argue, however, that the obligation 
                                                                                                             
4 Id., at paras. 55-56. 
5 [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 [hereinafter “L. (S.)”]. 
6 Id., at para. 40 (emphasis added). 
7 Id., at para. 54. 
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to pay attention to Charter values provides the lifeblood of substantive 
equality in every administrative law context. 
The concept of applying Charter values as a juridical tool in deci-
sion-making, while not new,8 has been given a more dominant role in 
administrative decision-making by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Doré decision. While the exact meanings and practical applications of 
this concept are as yet unclear, this paper makes a small step towards 
imagining the contours of Charter values. In particular we attempt to es-
tablish, as a first principle, the role of substantive equality as Charter 
values begin to solidify and take shape in the jurisprudence.  
The paper is divided into four parts. In Part II we present our fictional 
administrative law decision-making scenario located within the public 
school system. This scenario provides a concrete backdrop against which 
to imagine the function of substantive equality within Charter values. In 
Part II we also discuss the public school system in Canada as a key site 
for the application of Charter values, and a site where these values have 
been previously contested in law. Finally, in this part we lay out the 
empirical evidence showing that GLBTQ students, and the children of 
GLBTQ parents, suffer an equality deficit in Canadian public schools, 
which we argue can be addressed through the proper application of 
Charter values by decision-makers within the education system. 
Part III outlines our proposed administrative law framework for fur-
thering substantive equality. Specifically, Part III situates substantive 
equality within the existing framework of administrative law, and provides 
a blueprint for what substantive claims might look like under our proposed 
framework. Part IV treats the precise role of substantive equality, outlining 
a methodology for blending existing equality jurisprudence with the 
Court’s decision in Doré, using the fictional scenario as a backdrop. 
Finally Part IV demonstrates our proposed framework at work by 
applying it in the context of our fictional example. 
II. SETTING THE SCENE 
1. A Fictional Example 
We set our fictional administrative decision-making framework in 
Ontario in 2013. At a public school in urban Ontario, an openly lesbian 
                                                                                                             
8 See, for instance, Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at paras. 67, 68 and 85 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU”]. 
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Grade 2 teacher, S, decides to introduce materials into her classroom 
which discuss and normalize same-sex couples and their children, along-
side other family structures. S introduces books, a DVD and exercises 
which depict same-sex couples and their children. She and her principal 
believe that these materials comply with the existing Grade 2 social stud-
ies curriculum. 
S and her same-sex partner of 10 years have a son in the same school 
district, in Grade 6, who suffered homophobic bullying because he has 
same-sex parents. In that instance they invoked a 2012 Ontario statute9 to 
bring an end to the bullying. The statute aims to prevent homophobic and 
transphobic bullying through action against individual bullies,10 and pro-
gressive discipline against individuals who persist in homophobic or 
transphobic bullying.11 While the 2012 legislation also mandates that 
gay-straight alliances be permitted in any school12 where students de-
mand them, it falls short of curriculum reform which would expressly 
include same-sex couples, gay and lesbian people, or transgendered peo-
ple. S and her principal believe that one key method to end bullying is 
through talking about and normalizing same-sex couples, gays and lesbi-
ans, and transgendered people. 
In 2009 the Ontario Ministry of Education introduced Realizing the 
Promise of Diversity: Ontario’s Equity and Inclusive Education Strat-
egy,13 whose stated goals include eliminating all forms of discrimination 
in education, including homophobia.14 Among the action items included 
in the report, the Ministry commits to supporting schools that conduct a 
review of classroom strategies in order to “promote school-wide equity 
and inclusive education policies and practices”.15 
                                                                                                             
9 Bill 13, An Act to amend the Education Act with respect to bullying and other matters, 1st 
Sess., 40th Leg., Ontario, 2011 (assented to June 19, 2012), S.O. 2012, c. 5 [hereinafter “Accepting 
Schools Act”].  
10 Id., at cl. 11. 
11 Id., at cl .14. 
12 Id., at cl .12. 
13 Ontario Ministry of Education, Realizing the Promise of Diversity: Ontario’s Equity and 
Inclusive Education Strategy (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2009) [hereinafter “Realizing 
the Promise of Diversity”]. 
14 While the 2009 framework does not explicitly address transphobia, the 2012 Accepting 
Schools Act does include a prohibition against transphobic bullying. This paper deals exclusively 
with the depiction in public schools of same-sex couples with children. We acknowledge that the 
depiction of individual GLBTQ people or BTQ people and their families may raise different, but 
equally pressing, substantive equality issues.  
15 Realizing the Promise of Diversity, supra, note 13, at 22. 
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S has been an active part of her school’s equity review pursuant to 
this report, and in light of their conclusions, and in conjunction with her 
supportive principal, S carefully selects classroom materials which she 
and her principal feel promote school-wide equity and inclusiveness. In 
order to ensure compliance with the curriculum standards set out by the 
Minister, they ensure that the books, DVD and posters they select also 
help to ensure that their students will: “a) demonstrate an understanding 
that Canada is a country of many cultures; b) use a variety of resources 
and tools to gather, process, and communicate information about simi-
larities and differences among family traditions and celebrations; 
c) explain how the various cultures of individuals and groups contribute 
to the local community”16 and, in particular: “identify the origins and 
features of various families (e.g., nationality, culture, size, structure)”.17  
Because none of the materials on the Ministry-approved materials 
list include same-sex families, S and her principal rely on the regulations 
pursuant to the Education Act18 to supplement the existing list. Section 7 
of Regulation 29819 states:  
 (2) Where no textbook20 for the course of study is included in the 
list of the textbooks approved by the Minister the principal of a 
school, in consultation with the teachers concerned, shall, where they 
consider a textbook to be required, select a suitable textbook and, 
subject to the approval of the board, such textbook may be introduced 
for use in the school. 
Given that similar materials were being used by other teachers in 
nearby middle schools, S and her principal did not seek the explicit 
approval of the School Board before introducing the materials into the 
classroom. As part of their coursework the Grade 2 students did 
presentations on their own families, and S presented a photograph and 
explained the basic structure of her family. Children were encouraged to 
draw pictures, with some accompanying text, depicting various families 
they had learned about. Three children depicted same-sex families in 
                                                                                                             
16 Ontario Ministry of Education, The Ontario Curriculum: Social Studies, Grades 1 to 6 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2004), at 23.  
17 Id., at 25 (emphasis added).  
18 R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2 [hereinafter “Education Act”]. 
19 Operation of Schools — General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 298 [hereinafter “Regulation 298”]. 
20 For the purposes of the regulation, “textbook” is defined as a “comprehensive learning 
resource that is in print or electronic form, or that consists of any combination of print, electronic, 
and non-print materials” (Ontario Ministry of Education, Guidelines for Approval of Textbooks 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2006), at 6. 
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their drawings, with captions describing families with “two mommies” or 
“two daddies”. None of the children in the class had parents who 
comprised a same-sex couple, although there was a significant amount of 
other diversity, including lone parents, step-parents, and in one case a 
grandmother who acted as primary caregiver. 
When the drawings went home with the students, the parents of two 
of the children who had depicted same-sex families in their pictures were 
upset. They informed other parents, via the school e-mail directory, and 
four parents (out of a class of 18 students) made a complaint about the 
introduction of these materials, first to the principal of the school, who 
defended their introduction, and then to the Minister of Education. Some 
cited a conflict with their religious beliefs on marriage, and some thought 
it was “too early” to introduce Grade 2 students to same-sex families. 
Since being notified of the complaints by the Ministry of Education, 
the School Board21 in S’s area has told her to remove the materials from 
her classroom until they have approved her selections.22  
Our fictional scenario illuminates the role that Charter values might 
play in administrative decision-making in the wake of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec.23 All the way down the 
decision-making chain, from the Minister to teachers in the classroom, 
actors in provincial public education must act with Charter values as their 
lodestar. In particular, section 15, with its underlying guarantee of 
substantive equality, and section 7, underpinned by a concern for 
                                                                                                             
21 According to the Education Act, school boards must: 
169.1(1)(a) promote student achievement and well-being; 
(a.1) promote a positive school climate that is inclusive and accepting of all pupils, in-
cluding pupils of any race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, 
citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, 
age, marital status, family status or disability; 
(a.2) promote the prevention of bullying … 
22 While the Minister has the power to approve materials under s. 8(1) of the Education Act, 
this power has been delegated exclusively to school boards under s. 7 of Regulation 298 (emphasis 
added): 
(1) The principal of a school, in consultation with the teachers concerned, shall select 
from the list of the textbooks approved by the Minister the textbooks for the use of 
pupils of the school, and the selection shall be subject to the approval of the board. 
(2) Where no textbook for the course of study is included in the list of the textbooks 
approved by the Minister the principal of a school, in consultation with the teachers 
concerned, shall, where they consider a textbook to be required, select a suitable 
textbook and, subject to the approval of the board, such textbook may be introduced for 
use in the school. 
23 Doré, supra, note 3.  
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safeguarding physical and psychological integrity, are touchstones to guide 
the exercise of administrative powers.  
Situating Charter values as a factor in decision-making, of course, 
prompts a series of difficult questions. Many of these questions we touch 
upon below, and some will be addressed by courts as specific circum-
stances arise over time. While the application of Charter values to 
administrative decision-makers in and of itself sounds promising, exist-
ing Charter jurisprudence is, of course, complex and nuanced. For 
instance, what is the scope of Charter values (as opposed to Charter 
rights), how do we balance competing Charter values (or corresponding 
rights), and how does the balancing act required by section 1 of the Char-
ter find its way into a decision-making framework? 
2. The Importance of Schools  
Within our fictional scenario the focus is on public schools, and with 
good reason. The Supreme Court of Canada has on several occasions em-
phasized the importance of schools, echoing Aristotle’s view that it is 
obvious that there must also be training for the activities of virtue:24 
“Schools are meant to develop civic virtue and responsible citizenship, to 
educate in an environment free of bias, prejudice and intolerance.”25 Take 
the words of Major J. in Ross v. New Brunswick, School District No. 15:26  
A school is a communication centre for a whole range of values and 
aspirations of a society. In large part, it defines the values that 
transcend society through the educational medium. The school is an 
arena for the exchange of ideas and must, therefore, be premised upon 
principles of tolerance and impartiality so that all persons within the 
school environment feel equally free to participate.27 
The Court has also made clear that the place of the communication 
centre can only be understood by reference to the broader values of 
Canadian society. In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District, No. 36,28 the 
Court was addressing the appropriateness of a decision by a local school 
board to refuse to approve books depicting same-sex families for use in 
the classroom. Although the case turned on the interpretation of a 
                                                                                                             
24 Aristotle, Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Aristotle Series, 1997).  
25 TWU, supra, note 8, at para. 13, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. 
26 [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ross”]. 
27 Id., at para. 42. 
28 [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. 
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provincial statute, McLachlin C.J.C.’s statement of principle rings loud 
and beyond the borders of the province:  
The School Act’s emphasis on secularism reflects the fact that Canada 
is a diverse and multicultural society, bound together by the values of 
accommodation, tolerance and respect for diversity. These values are 
reflected in our Constitution’s commitment to equality and minority 
rights, and are explicitly incorporated into the British Columbia public 
school system by the preamble to the School Act and by the curriculum 
established by regulation under the Act.29 
Moreover, given their role in shaping the minds of the young, educators 
“are responsible for the future of the country”.30 Accordingly, they have 
“onerous responsibilities”:31 
… The importance of ensuring an equal and discrimination free 
educational environment, and the perception of fairness and tolerance 
in the classroom are paramount in the education of young children. 
This helps foster self-respect and acceptance by others.32 
Indeed, each school board must be “ever vigilant of anything” that might 
interfere with its “duty to maintain a positive school environment for all 
persons served by it”.33 They must “act in a way that promotes respect 
and tolerance for all the diverse groups that it represents and serves”.34 If 
this causes them to run into objections from parents, so be it: “Parental 
views, however important, cannot override the imperative placed upon 
the British Columbia public schools to mirror the diversity of the 
community and teach tolerance and understanding of difference.”35 
The public school is an apt legal space to investigate Charter values 
in administrative decision-making. There are many decision-makers from 
principals to school boards whose choices may be subject to legal scru-
tiny, and there are many competing values and rights to be balanced. The 
public school is also a place where Canadian values, as enshrined in our 
Constitution, are to be modelled as well as taught.  
                                                                                                             
29 Id., at para. 21. 
30 R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at para. 35 (S.C.C.), Cory J.  
31 Id.  
32 Ross, supra, note 26, at para. 82. 
33 Id., at para. 50, approving the reasoning of a Board of Inquiry constituted under the 
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11 (since repealed, now R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 171) . 
34 Chamberlain, supra, note 28, at para. 25. 
35 Id., at para. 33. 
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Our fictional example deals with that difficult balancing act between 
competing values and rights; in this case the equality rights of GLBTQ 
people, and the right to religious expression. The following section pre-
sents empirical research demonstrating that GLBTQ students, and 
students with GLBTQ parents, face discrimination in public schools, and 
that this kind of inequity has serious consequences for these students. We 
argue that an appropriate application of Charter values in this case would 
result in a public school system free of discrimination for all students 
regardless of their (or their parents’) sexual or gender identity. 
3. The Empirical Evidence 
There are documented impacts of school-based homophobic dis-
crimination on gay and lesbian youth, and the children of gay and lesbian 
parents. This empirical evidence speaks to the important role of the 
school curriculum in combating negative impacts. 
The day-to-day experience of queer students in Canadian public 
schools is extremely difficult.36 Canadian research in the area has 
revealed that the majority of queer youth experience homophobic 
harassment, and even assault, on a regular basis in their school 
environments.37 Research also reveals that LGBT students who suffer 
from homophobic bullying show increased rates of headaches, sleep 
disturbances and absences from school.38 More seriously, queer 
youth have a lowered sense of self-esteem,39 attempt suicide at alarming 
                                                                                                             
36 Three-quarters of LGBTQ students feel unsafe in at least one place at school, such as 
change rooms, washrooms and hallways. Half of straight students agree that at least one part of their 
school is unsafe for LGBTQ students. Transgender students are especially likely to see at least one 
of these places as unsafe (87 per cent). Catherine Taylor et al., Youth Speak Up about Homophobia 
and Transphobia: The First National Climate Survey on Homophobia in Canadian Schools 
(Toronto: Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, 2008), at 3 [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
37 Six out of 10 LGBTQ students in British Columbia report being verbally harassed about 
their sexual orientation. Nine out of 10 transgender students, six out of 10 LGB students and three 
out of 10 straight students were verbally harassed because of their expression of gender. One in four 
LGB students had been physically harassed about their sexual orientation. Almost two in five 
transgender students, and one in five LGB students, reported being physically harassed due to their 
expression of gender. See id., at 4. See also Elizabeth Saewyc et al., Not Yet Equal: The Health of 
Lesbian, Gay, & Bisexual Youth in B.C. (Vancouver: The McCreary Centre Society, 2007), at 14-16 
[hereinafter “Saewyc”]. 
38 Stephen Russell et al., “Adolescent Perceptions of School Safety for Students with 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Parents” (2008) 5:4 Journal of LGBT Youth 11, at 14 
[hereinafter “Russell, ‘Adolescent Perceptions’”]. 
39 Saewyc, supra, note 37, at 29. 
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rates,40 and have high rates of drug and alcohol abuse.41 Queer youth are 
often forced to hide their sexual orientation from their peers and mentors, 
and many have poor relationships with unsupportive families.42  
Extensive research in Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom has consistently identified adverse effects of homophobic bul-
lying on the physical and mental health of gay, lesbian and transgendered 
youth.43 Negative health effects include increased suicidal ideation and 
                                                                                                             
40 Id., at 30-32. In Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at 601 
(S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “a study by the Quebec Human Rights 
Commission has indicated that the isolation, harassment and violence imposed by the public and the 
rejection by their families has caused young homosexuals to have a higher rate of attempted and 
successful suicide than heterosexual youths”. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, dissenting in TWU v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers, noted:  
Canada has one of the highest youth suicide rates in the world ... Of all teens who commit 
suicide, about one third appear to be homosexual in orientation. Many such youth become 
depressed in the ongoing struggle with social fear and rejection ... Cognitive, emotional and 
social isolation, ongoing external and internalized homophobia and lack of support may lead 
homosexually oriented adolescents to perceive suicide as their only means of escape ... 
“Closeted” adolescents who are aware of their same-sex attraction but who have not yet 
established a positive homosexual identity, are at particular risk for suicide. 
(TWU, supra, note 25, at para. 85.) Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also quoted a study that concluded 46 
per cent of gay and lesbian youth had attempted suicide at least once. Their average age at the first 
suicide attempt was 13 years. See Being Out: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Youth in B.C.: 
An Adolescent Health Survey (Burnaby: The McCreary Centre Society, 1999). 
41 Saewyc, supra, note 37, at 25-28. 
42 Many LGBTQ students would not be comfortable talking to their teachers (four in 10), 
their principal (six in 10), or their coach (seven in 10) about LGBTQ issues. Only one in five 
LGBTQ students could talk to a parent comfortably about LGBTQ issues. Three-quarters could talk 
to a close friend about these issues. See Taylor, supra, note 36, at 5. The unwillingness of some 
families to accept their children as queer is evidenced in the high rates of homelessness among 
LGBT youth. See No Place to Call Home: A Profile of Street Youth in British Columbia 
(Vancouver: The McCreary Centre Society, 2007). 
43 See Dorothy L. Espelage et al., “Homophobic Teasing, Psychological Outcomes, and 
Sexual Orientation Among High School Students: What Influences do Parents and Schools Have?” 
(2008) 37:2 School Psychology Rev. 202; Yue Zhao et al., “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt Among 
Adolescents Reporting ‘Unsure’ Sexual Identity or Heterosexual Identity Plus Same-Sex Attraction 
or Behavior: Forgotten Groups?” (2010) 49:2 J. American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry 104 [hereinafter “Zhao”]; E. Hetrick & A. Martin, “Developmental Issues and Their 
Resolution for Gay and Lesbian Adolescents” (1987) 14:1-2 J. Homosexuality 25, at 35-36; Ilan H. 
Meyer, “Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: 
Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence” (2003) 129:5 Psych. Bull. 674, at 682; Elizabeth Saewyc, 
“Contested Conclusions: Claims That Can (and Cannot) Be Made from the Current Research on 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Teen Suicide Attempts” (2007) 3:1 J. LGBT Health Research 79; Joanna 
Almeida et al., “Emotional Distress Among LGBT Youth: The Influence of Perceived 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation” (2009) 38 J. Youth Adolescence 1001; Robert Valois 
et al., “Peer Victimisation and Perceived Life Satisfaction among Early Adolescents in the United 
States” (2012) 43 Am. J. of Health Education 258; Eliza Dragowski, “Sexual Ordination 
Victimization and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms Among Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Youth” (2012) 
23 Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 226. 
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suicide attempts,44 increased maladaptive coping mechanisms such as 
drug and alcohol use,45 and increased rates of depression and anxiety.46 
Less research has been conducted to gauge the effects of a negative 
school environment on the children of gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-
gendered parents, but preliminary results indicate that “children of LGBT 
parents face LGBT bias-motivated victimization or harassment”.47  
Several longitudinal studies have shown that the overall outcomes 
around emotional and cognitive function, and other indicators, are equal 
as between children raised by heterosexual parents and those raised by 
                                                                                                             
44 See Zhao, id., at 104 (citations omitted):  
GLB adolescents report higher rates of risk factors for suicide behavior, including de-
pression, anxiety, alcohol and substance abuse, eating disorders, early sexual activity and 
more sexual partners, being victims of violence, family history of criminal offending, and 
family disruptions. Even after controlling for traditional risk factors, GLB sexual status is 
independently associated with suicidal ideation and attempt. 
Karine J. Igartua, Kathryn Gill & Richard Montoro, “Internalized Homophobia: A Factor in 
Depression, Anxiety, and Suicide in the Gay and Lesbian Population” (2003) 22:2 Can. J. 
Community Mental Health 15, at 17 (citations omitted):  
A handful of doctoral dissertations have demonstrated an inverse correlation between in-
ternalized homophobia and self-esteem in both gay men and lesbians. Other unpublished 
studies have shown a correlation between internalized homophobia and depressive symp-
tomatology in gay men and lesbians. Still other dissertations have found associations 
between internalized homophobia and alcohol abuse in gay men and lesbians.  
Stephen T. Russell et al., “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Adolescent School 
Victimization: Implications for Young Adult Health and Adjustment” (2011) 81:5 J. School Health 
223, at 223-24 (citations omitted):  
Prior research has identified strong associations between secondary school victimization 
(where motivated by LGBT-related bias or not) and compromised health and adjustment 
during adolescences. School victimization has been linked to compromised academic 
achievement and school absenteeism, aggressive behavior, compromised emotional 
health and suicidal ideation. In addition, physical victimization is linked to substance use, 
delinquency, and aggression, particularly for boys.  
45 See Russell, id.; Zhao, id.; Margaret S. Schneider, “Educators’ Beliefs about Raising 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues in the Schools: The Experience in Ontario, Canada” 
(2008) 5:4 J. LGBT Youth 49, at 51 (citations omitted): “The impact of harassment on youth 
includes mental health consequences such as depression, developmental delay, lower grades, 
absenteeism and higher drop-out rates, substance abuse, and a greater likelihood of carrying a 
weapon to school.”  
46 See Ian Rivers, “Recollections of Bullying at School and Their Long-Term Implications 
for Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals” (2004) 25:4 The Journal of Crisis Intervention and Suicide 
Prevention 169. See also Michelle Birkett et al., “LGB and Questioning Students in Schools: The 
Moderating Effects of Homophobic Bullying and School Climate on Negative Outcomes” (2009) 
38 Journal of Youth Adolescence 989, at 991.  
47 Russell, “Adolescent Perceptions”, supra, note 38, at 12. See also: Hatred in the 
Hallways: Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students in 
U.S. Schools (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), online: Human Rights Watch 
<http://www.hrw.org>.  
180 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
gay or lesbian parents.48 The research also shows, however, that one 
main difference is that “the children of gays/lesbians were more con-
cerned about stigmatisation and fear of being teased”.49 A 2008 American 
study measuring students’ perceptions of school safety for those with gay 
or lesbian parents drew on data from 2,559 middle- and high-school stu-
dents in California. The authors concluded that “youth believe that 
children of LGBT parents may experience an unsafe (school) environ-
ment”.50 The study found that students in schools with a Gay Straight 
Alliance club51 reported higher levels of perceived safety, as did those 
who knew where to get information on LGBTQ issues, and those whose 
teachers actively intervened to stop homophobic behaviours in schools.52 
Education on LGBTQ issues also increased the safety of students with 
LGBTQ parents.53 
Across three major studies, less than 50 per cent of queer students in 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom reported incidents to 
their schools.54 Of those who did report incidents, approximately 30 per 
cent reported that their schools/teachers did nothing. “Only seven per 
cent of teachers [in the United Kingdom] are reported to respond every 
time they hear homophobic language.”55 In one study, some respondents 
actually indicated that staff told the queer student to ignore the problem 
(2.2 per cent).56 One of the open-ended questions in the same study asked 
what the staff person did when notified about the homophobic incident. 
                                                                                                             
48 N. Anderssen, C. Amlie & E.A. Ytteroy, “Outcomes for Children with Lesbian or Gay 
Parents: A Review of Studies from 1978 to 2000” (2002) 43:4 Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 
335. See also 2012 National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study, online: National Longitudinal 
Lesbian Family Study <http://www.nllfs.org>; Timothy J Biblarz & Judith Stacey, “How Does the 
Gender of Parents Matter?” (2010) 72:1 Journal of Marriage and Family 3. 
49 Russell, “Adolescent Perceptions”, supra, note 38, at 14. 
50 Id., at 25.  
51 See generally Gay-Straight Alliance Network, online: GSA Network <http://www. 
gsanetwork.org>. 
52 Russell, supra, note 38, at 22. 
53 Id. 
54 See Ruth Hunt & Johan Jensen, The School Report: The Experiences of Young Gay 
People in Britain’s Schools (London: Stonewall, 2007), at 8 [hereinafter “Hunt & Jensen”]; 
J.G. Kosciw, E.A. Greytak & E.M. Diaz, “Who, What, Where, When and Why: Demographic and 
Ecological Factors Contributing to Hostile School Climate for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Youth” (2009) 38:7 Journal of Youth Adolescence 976 [hereinafter “Kosciw, Greytak 
& Diaz”]; Catherine Taylor & Tracey Peter, Every Class in Every School: Final Report on the First 
National Climate Survey on Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia in Canadian Schools 
(Toronto: Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, 2011), at 119 [hereinafter “Taylor & Peter”].  
55 Hunt & Jensen, supra, note 54, at 8. 
56 Kosciw, Greytak & Diaz, supra, note 54. 
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In response to that question, an American 11th Grade boy said: “Nothing 
actually. Rocks were thrown at me and nothing was done about it.”57 This 
captures the general feeling held by queer students that teachers and 
school staff are ineffective at responding to homophobic harassment. 
The benefits of attending a school with queer-supportive policies and 
curricula are also well documented. Each of the national school climate 
surveys from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom present 
important statistics on the remedial effects of a queer-friendly school en-
vironment. In the United Kingdom school climate study, they found that 
“lesbian and gay pupils who go to schools that state homophobic bully-
ing is wrong are nearly 70 per cent more likely to feel safe at school”.58 
Similarly, in Canada, “LGBTQ students who come from schools with 
anti-homophobia policies were significantly less likely to report feeling 
unsafe in general at school (61.4% compared to 75.8% of LGBTQ stu-
dents at schools without anti-homophobia policies) or feeling unsafe due 
to their sexual orientation (41.4% compared to 56.6%).”59 In the United 
States, students also felt less unsafe in schools with inclusive curricula 
than those without (42.1 per cent versus 63.6 per cent).60 With respect to 
homophobic remarks in Canada:  
Students from schools with anti-homophobia policies or procedures 
reported hearing expressions like “that’s so gay” less often than 
participants from schools without such policies (65.4% versus 80.6% 
reported hearing such comments every day). […] the same relationship 
holds for homophobic comments such as “faggot,” “queer,” “lezbo,” or 
“dyke” (47.9% compared to 62.6% reported hearing such comments 
every day).61 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHERING 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
This section of the paper introduces our proposed administrative law 
framework for furthering substantive equality. We first situate substan-
tive equality within the existing framework of administrative law, and 
then provide a blueprint for what administrative law claims might look 
                                                                                                             
57 Id. 
58 Hunt & Jensen, supra, note 54, at 2. 
59 Taylor & Peter, supra, note 54, at 119. 
60 Kosciw, Greytak & Diaz, supra, note 54, at 66. 
61 Taylor & Peter, supra, note 54, at 116. 
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like under our proposed framework. This section provides a structure 
within which to discuss the decision to be made by our fictional school 
board regarding the introduction of material that normalizes same-sex 
parents and their children, against the wishes of some parents. 
1. Judicial Review and Administrative Decision-Making 
We traverse two linked avenues of inquiry in this paper. One allows 
us to explore the possibility of using judicial review doctrine to further 
substantive equality. The other permits an exploration of how substantive 
equality can be achieved through the workings of the administrative 
decision-making process. Our focus throughout is on the principal actors 
in the area of education: provincial ministers and their civil servants, 
school boards, principals and teachers. 
Administrative lawyers have a tendency to focus on the first avenue 
of inquiry: the doctrines of judicial review are the focus of most 
teaching and scholarship on administrative law. In its preoccupation 
with legality, rationality and fairness,62 judicial review is undoubtedly 
important. A British government handbook for civil servants is entitled 
The Judge Over Your Shoulder.63 The title captures an important idea. 
When administrative decision-makers formulate policies and make 
decisions, theirs is not the only presence in the room. A ghostly shadow 
is cast on their deliberations by the spectre of subsequent review in the 
courts. With the ex post check of judicial oversight ever possible, 
administrative decision-making must conform to legal norms. Many 
individual decisions will be taken with these norms in mind.64 Over 
time, assuming appropriate oversight mechanisms, institutional culture 
must move towards conformity with legal norms. Conformity cannot be 
taken for granted, however. It may be slow in coming and there may be 
areas of decision-making which are never exposed to the judicial 
microscope. Nevertheless, in the absence of compelling evidence to the 
contrary, logic and data suggest that judicial oversight must have some 
                                                                                                             
62 Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, 
at para. 24 (S.C.C.). 
63 The Judge Over Your Shoulder, 4th ed. (London: Treasury Solicitor’s Department, 2006). 
64 Given the diffuse nature of administrative decision-making and its oversight, it would be 
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Lorne Sossin, “Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law: Policy, Discretion and Social Welfare” 
(2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 147. 
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effect on administrative decision-making.65 If nothing else, the norms 
embodied in judicial review doctrine provide benchmarks against which 
administrative actors can measure their performance. They have a 
reflexive quality. 
Judicial review has a function, too, beyond the regulation of interac-
tions between individuals and administrative decision-makers. Judges are 
public officials and the norms they develop and apply have a public qual-
ity. Judicially imposed norms must closely track social values. This is not 
to say that judges must respond slavishly to every twist and turn in public 
opinion. Rather, the past and present of social values, read large, provide 
a framework in which legal norms can be articulated.66 For these reasons, 
judicial review is rightly a focus of attention.  
It ought not, however, to be the sole focus of attention. Decisions and 
the decision-making processes that produce them will always be indi-
viduals’ first points of contact with administrative law. Often, they will 
be the last. Lack of resources may preclude an individual from seeking 
judicial review, and judicial doctrines of justiciability may preclude 
judges from entertaining the merits of individual cases.67 Placing too 
much emphasis on judicial review in the education context blithely pre-
supposes that courts can consistently conduct necessary oversight. Yet it 
is more likely that judicial control will be exercised in fits and starts, if at 
all in the case of lower-level decision-makers.  
Moreover, when judicial review does take place, it does so at one 
remove from the decision-making process. The intimacy of the relation-
ship between individual and administrative decision-maker has no 
equivalent in the judicial forum, a point of evident importance in the con-
text of the relationship between vulnerable children and adolescents and 
those in positions of authority.68 Where relationships are informed by 
power imbalances, the consequences of failing to respect the dignity in-
terests of one of the parties can be devastating. Extra burdens are placed 
                                                                                                             
65 Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of Soft Law: How Judicial Decisions Influence Bureaucratic 
Discretion in Canada” in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic 
Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 129, at 158. Sossin cautions, however, that judicial review’s effect may be felt in different 
ways in different settings. 
66 Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
67 See, e.g., Robert Summers, “Justiciability” (1963) 26:5 Mod. L. Rev. 530. 
68 See generally Geneviève Cartier, “Administrative Discretion and the Spirit of Legality: 
From Theory to Practice” (2009) 24 C.J.L.S. 313. But see Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: 
The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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on decision-makers, moral burdens which weigh whether or not there is 
judicial or administrative oversight of their actions. 
In addition, administrative policies may shape the exercise of discre-
tion and the development of the individual/decision-maker relationship. 
This is hardly problematic: administrative policies serve important func-
tions of efficiency and certainty.69 But when “soft law” is framed and 
applied,70 other considerations should be borne in mind. If exercises of 
discretion and decision-making procedures are shaped by soft law, it will 
affect individuals and ought to be designed, then, in the knowledge that 
soft law serves individuals and values other than simply efficiency and 
certainty. A focus on soft law is especially appropriate in the education 
context, where instruments other than binding legal rules significantly 
shape the decision-making environment: curricula, policy directives and 
school board policies, to name but a few, are of critical importance.  
Finally, articulation of the values of administrative actors is of great 
importance.71 Concerns of an institutional and human nature attend exer-
cises of discretionary authority. Decision-makers do not act in an 
institutional or moral vacuum; they live and act by reference to “civil 
servants’ values”.72 As creatures of their environments, they can be ex-
pected to uphold institutional norms. Administrative actors exercising 
discretionary authority “build up sets of principles to guide them in the 
exercise of what is on paper an entirely unfettered discretion”.73 In a 
similar vein, Dickson J. (as he then was) noted that knowledge, fairness 
and integrity are important characteristics of those charged with adminis-
tering and implementing policy.74 As humans, they can also be expected 
to uphold moral norms. As living, breathing creatures capable of reflec-
tion, we should also expect administrative actors to act compassionately, 
                                                                                                             
69 Nabors Canada Ltd. v. Alberta (Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ 
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in a way responsive to the individuals they serve.75 Fairness in judicial 
review and policy guidelines is important, but fairness at the heart of 
administration is vital.  
Values, too, influence the exercise of discretion. Sometimes those 
values are immanent in the statute; they can form part of the “perspective 
within which a statute is intended to operate”.76 An example is Baker v. 
Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration).77 Here, an immigra-
tion officer’s decision denying an application for an exemption on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds was quashed, for the reasons 
he presented indicated that his decision was “inconsistent with the values 
underlying the grant of discretion”.78 As he was bound to “act in a hu-
manitarian and compassionate manner”,79 his failure to do so vitiated the 
decision.  
Charter values also permeate perspective. Indeed, administrative 
actors must act consistently with those values.80 Such is the importance 
of this edict that even where legislation precludes consideration of 
Charter guarantees per se, administrative actors must still take Charter 
values into account.81 And what are these values, to which all 
administrative actors — including ministers, civil servants, school 
boards, principals and teachers — must have reference? Referring to 
section 1 of the Charter, Dickson C.J.C. gave a helpful précis: 
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a 
free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a 
few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment 
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and 
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and 
groups in society.82 
                                                                                                             
75 See, e.g., Lorne Sossin, “Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts, and the Equitable 
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To invite reliance on Charter values is not to invite opacity. Still less 
is it an invitation to palm tree justice. Reasoned decision-making need 
not be sacrificed on the altar of Charter values. Decision-makers should 
be guided by fairness, as we argue, but also by the edict that reasons for 
decisions should “allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribu-
nal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion 
is within the range of acceptable outcomes”.83 The Federal Court of Ap-
peal has recently put the point very well, addressing a related concern 
about an administrative tribunal’s inability to precisely quantify factors it 
was required to take into account in reaching a decision: 
When precise quantification is not reasonably possible for a given 
element, a rough estimate is to be preferred to a subjective judgment 
call. When neither a precise quantification nor a rough estimate is 
reasonably possible for a given element, then of course there will be a 
certain degree of discretion in attributing weight to any remaining 
qualitative [elements], but this discretion must be curtailed and limited 
by the principles of reasonableness. In other words, any weight given to 
the remaining unquantifiable qualitative effects must be reasonable, 
i.e., it must be supported by the evidence, and the reasoning behind 
the Tribunal’s weighting must be clearly articulated or otherwise 
discernable.84 
Charter values are very important, but their importance does not 
legitimate departures from appropriately rigorous decision-making. 
2. Substantive Claims within the Legal Framework 
What spaces exist for the furthering of substantive equality within 
the existing administrative law framework? Five can be identified. 
First, consider the apparent importance accorded to general norms. 
Questions of general law that are both of central importance to the legal 
system as a whole and outside a decision-maker’s specialized area 
of expertise fall in the judicial domain.85 Should a decision-maker 
make a misstep in answering such a question, the courts stand ready to 
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intervene.86 Enforcement of these general norms, then, is within the 
judicial bailiwick. Ensuring that certain important factors are taken into 
account in decision-making processes might amount to the sort of 
general norm that deserves Canada-wide enforcement. If there are 
important characteristics of vulnerable individuals which are common to 
multiple regulatory regimes, reviewing courts could ensure that 
administrative actors give the characteristics due consideration. Failure 
to do so would result in decisions being quashed and remitted for 
reconsideration of the previously overlooked characteristics. For 
example, prior to the reorientation of judicial review doctrine in 
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,87 the Court applied a standard of review of 
correctness in TWU,88 a case in which the respondent had refused to 
accredit the teacher training program of a private university. The refusal 
was based on the homophobic internal policy of the school, 
Responsibilities of a Membership in the Community of Trinity Western 
University, to which students and faculty were to adhere. Justices 
Iacobucci and Bastarache noted that “[t]he existence of discriminatory 
practices is based on the interpretation of the TWU documents and 
human rights values and principles. This is a question of law that is 
concerned with human rights and not essentially educational matters.”89 
TWU provides some support for the existence of a general norm of non-
discrimination, which reviewing courts can stand ready to enforce. It 
may be that the TWU foundation has been washed away by the recent 
waves of reform.90 However, regardless of its precise place as a matter of 
judicial review doctrine, non-discrimination is doubtless a key 
benchmark against which ministers, civil servants, school boards, 
principals and teachers should judge themselves. 
Second, the Canadian definition of unreasonableness has ample 
scope for the furthering of substantive equality claims. Failing to pay 
heed to the need to accord substantively equal treatment to vulnerable 
individuals or failing to take into account evidence which is relevant 
because of the need to accord substantively equal treatment could  
                                                                                                             
86 Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 
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88 TWU, supra, note 8.  
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cause a decision-making process to lack the necessary “justification, 
transparency and intelligibility” or a decision to fall outside the range of 
acceptable and rational solutions.91 This may be a more appropriate 
means of furthering substantive equality claims in Canadian 
administrative law. Elevating considerations to mandatory status as 
general norms could reduce the degree of deference accorded to 
administrative actors, whereas conceiving of failures to take important 
characteristics into account as tending to lead to unreasonableness strikes 
a balance between administrative autonomy and the aim of furthering 
substantive equality.  
Third, administrative actors must take Charter values into account in 
exercising their discretion. Values must be distinguished from guaran-
tees: even in cases where an individual cannot surmount the formal 
thresholds of specific Charter rights, “the values they reflect” can still be 
a relevant consideration for administrative actors.92 In furthering substan-
tive equality, this distinction is critical. Although many vulnerable 
individuals would not be able to surmount the high thresholds of, say, 
section 7 of the Charter, they can invoke the values underpinning them. 
An individual’s life, liberty and security of the person may not be threat-
ened to such an extent that section 7 is itself engaged, but where 
administrative decisions touch upon these aspects of vulnerable people’s 
lives, discretion should be exercised in an appropriately sensitive man-
ner. More broadly still, the notions of compassion and fairness, in a 
broader setting of constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of law, ani-
mate the provisions of the Charter. For the vulnerable individual, these 
notions are full of vitality. Section 15’s guarantee of substantive equality 
looms especially large in this decision-making picture, whether or not the 
formal threshold of section 15 is surpassed. 
Fourth, when it comes to statutory values, a broad view should be 
taken of statutory purposes. As public documents, statutes should be con-
strued by reference to institutional and social values. Imbuing statutory 
provisions with values such as knowledge, fairness, integrity and com-
passion will give further guidance to administrative actors as to how they 
should exercise their authority, to institutions formulating guidelines, and 
courts in their reviewing roles. For example, the overarching principle of 
tolerance in British Columbia’s School Act93 has been held to have the 
                                                                                                             
91 Dunsmuir, supra, note 87, at para. 47. 
92 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 3, per Abella J.  
93 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412 [hereinafter “School Act”]. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARTER VALUES IN EDUCATION 189 
effect that while a school board is “indeed free to address the religious 
concerns of parents, it must be sure to do so in a manner that gives equal 
recognition and respect to other members of the community”.94 
Fifth, “soft law” can be adapted to the requirements of substantive 
equality. Statutes provide baselines and, by and large, high ceilings. 
Institutions and those arguing within them can exploit this space to 
improve the lot of vulnerable individuals. At base, though, the exercise of 
discretion is a human endeavour and should be treated as such. Training 
administrative actors what to look for and how to react to it remains 
paramount. Adapting law and discretion is important, but we should not 
lose sight of the human element at the heart of government. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY95 
1. Blending the Court’s Substantive Equality Jurisprudence  
into Doré 
While we do not know yet the precise parameters of “Charter values” 
as defined in Doré, we argue that no definition could rightly exclude 
substantive equality. In attempting to sketch out what the Charter value 
of substantive equality might look like, we draw upon the work of 
Patricia Hughes, who has argued that substantive equality should be 
considered “a foundational constitutional principle”96 alongside judicial 
independence, federalism, political speech and democracy. Hughes 
argues, and we agree, that substantive equality must permeate our 
constitutional framework and the attendant jurisprudence, beyond its 
explicit guarantee under section 15.97 We argue that substantive equality 
infuses each of the five areas of administrative law outlined in the section 
above:98 it is a general norm, a relevant consideration, a Charter value, a 
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statutory value and a lodestar which administrative decision-makers 
should follow. Moreover, in each of these areas, it is supplemented by the 
values underpinning section 7’s protection of life, liberty and security of 
the person.  
This section outlines the approach we would take to blending sub-
stantive equality with the Court’s direction to proportionally balance 
Charter values in Doré, and shows what this would look like as applied 
to our fictional administrative decision-making scenario. 
According to Hughes, substantive equality can be defined as  
a form of equality which is satisfied only if policy or law is made 
meaningful for all members of society, including those who have been 
racialised or systemically defined by gender, sexuality, or disability or 
similar kinds of characteristics, as well as intersecting identities; in 
contrast, formal equality is satisfied if everyone is treated as subject to 
the law or is subject to it in the same way.99  
The Court in Doré100 notes that administrative decision-makers are in 
the best position to balance competing Charter guarantees against the 
objectives of their home statutes, by asking “how the Charter value at 
issue will best be protected in light of the statutory objectives”.101 The 
Court states that this “requires the decision-maker to balance the severity 
of the interference of the Charter protection with the statutory 
objectives”.102 The Court goes on to describe this “balancing” of Charter 
values and statutory objectives as similar to the proportionality analysis 
under Oakes: “In the Charter context, the reasonableness analysis is one 
that centres on proportionality, that is, on ensuring that the decision 
interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee no more than is necessary 
given the statutory objectives.” 103 
This balancing is where substantive equality should be taken into 
account. When assessing the impact of their decisions on historically 
disadvantaged groups, decision-makers must strive to identify an 
interpretation of their home statute that renders it meaningful to these 
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groups. According to Hughes, this would mean applying laws in ways that 
can “recognize the multivariate nature of the communities subject to the 
same law”.104 We argue that in the administrative law context this means 
applying home statutes in ways that take into account the difference 
between Canadians, within the parameters of their legislative mandate. In 
other words, administrative decision-makers must consider how equality-
seeking groups may be subject to their home statute in different ways, 
depending on their social location. 
While the Court in Doré does not specifically address the appropriate 
methodology when decision-makers are tasked with balancing competing 
Charter guarantees, the Court does note that decision-makers must show “a 
proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play”.105 Competing 
Charter interests are, of course, central to our fictional example. In our 
situation the school board will be asked to balance the section 15 equality 
interests of the children of gay and lesbian parents,106 and the freedom of 
religion interests of those parents objecting to the materials on religious 
grounds.107 More subtle, but no less important, is the obligation to respect an 
important value underpinning section 7: freedom from harm. Introducing 
classroom materials that aim to demonstrate the reality and normality of 
same-sex relationships assists in reducing prejudice and, accordingly, 
psychological and physical harm. Given that it is acceptable for school 
boards to take the religious views108 of their constituents into account in 
decision-making, alongside secular concerns for tolerance and diversity, 
what is required is a proportional balance of these Charter interests alongside 
the statutory objectives as outlined in the Ontario Education Act. 
The Court in Doré required the administrative decision-maker in that 
case to balance freedom of speech against a statutory requirement to 
protect the public from unprofessional conduct by lawyers, whose 
profession must be conducted in the public interest. In our fictional 
scenario the Charter values in question do not run counter to the 
achievement of statutory objectives. Rather, both freedom of religion and 
                                                                                                             
104 Hughes, supra, note 96, at 33. 
105 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 57. 
106 It is also possible that with older children and youth, this scenario would also require a 
balancing of the equality interests of gay and lesbian students themselves. 
107 It is also possible that with older children and youth, this scenario would also require a 
balancing of the religious rights of observant students themselves. 
108 “Because religion plays an important role in the life of many communities, these views 
will often be motivated by religious concerns. Religion is an integral aspect of people’s lives, and 
cannot be left at the (school) boardroom door”: Chamberlain, supra, note 28, at para. 19. 
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substantive equality are Charter values which form the perspective within 
which statutory powers granted by the Education Act must be exercised.109 
If anything, it is Charter values themselves, or at least their expression by 
teachers, principals and parents, which are possibly in conflict. But as we 
seek to explain, in the public school system in Ontario, freedom of religion 
is not quite as vital a concern as the promotion of substantive equality. 
In attempting to operationalize administrative decision-making 
within a context of Charter values, we do not strictly limit our under-
standing of substantive equality to section 15 jurisprudence,110 although 
as Hughes notes this jurisprudence “will be both a reference for judges 
and a foil against which to develop a more expansive meaning of sub-
stantive equality as a foundational principle”.111 The understanding and 
deployment of substantive equality will be altered and shaped by the 
context in which it is used. In developing our framework we draw on the 
extant jurisprudence under section 15, and the notion of balancing or 
proportionality drawn from the Court’s direction in Doré. From the  
section 15 jurisprudence we argue that effects and context are two key 
factors to consider. In order to ensure that substantive equality is met, a 
proportional balancing of competing interests in the administrative con-
text must take into account the social and legal context of the respective 
claimants, and the actual effects of the decision on those who will be  
impacted.112 Although the precise methodology for applying context and 
                                                                                                             
109 While s. 51(2) of Ontario’s Education Act prohibits mandatory religious practice or observance 
within the public school system, it does not refer specifically to secularism as a tenet of its public school 
system. In contrast, see s. 76(1) of British Columbia’s School Act, supra, note 93, which reads: “All schools 
and Provincial schools must be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles.” The Ontario 
Act also explicitly prohibits bullying based on sexual orientation, as noted above. 
110 See, e.g., Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 
396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”]; R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Kapp”]; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 
2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.); Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 
S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.); 
Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 
12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.); Andrews, supra, note 99. 
111 Hughes, supra, note 96, at 40. 
112 We are alive to the critique of eliding s. 15 and s. 1 analyses in equality jurisprudence. 
See, e.g., Sheila McIntyre, “Deference and Dominance: Equality Without Substance” in Diminishing 
Returns, supra, note 98, at 95; Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: 
Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011-2012) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31, at 59 [hereinafter “Koshan 
& Watson Hamilton”]. In this circumstance, however, the Court in Doré at times seems to suggest 
the implication of an Oakes-like proportionality into the legal analysis (see paras. 66, 71). In this 
case, the unfortunate result may be a hybridization of the two concepts, which ought to remain 
distinct in s. 15 jurisprudence. This is a question that will have to be worked out in future cases. 
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effects has differed over the course of equality jurisprudence113 the two 
have remained consistent throughout, and provide the backdrop against 
which the Court has (re)theorized substantive equality.114 
Leaving aside the merits of the Supreme Court of Canada’s applica-
tion of these principles of substantive equality within the section 15 
jurisprudence,115 we wish to emphasize the Court’s consistent use of le-
gal and social context, and of the actual effects of discriminatory 
decision-making on vulnerable groups. In their analysis of the Withler 
case, Koshan and Watson Hamilton116 note that the Court maintains its 
historical focus on a contextual approach to equality jurisprudence. “The 
Court also reaffirmed a contextual approach to section 15(1), one that 
should focus on ‘the actual situation of the group and the potential of the 
impugned law to worsen their situation’.”117 They and others118 note that 
ignoring social context, such as the role of gender or class, in decision-
making can lead to discriminatory treatment.119 
The Court’s s. 15(1) jurisprudence has consistently affirmed that the 
s. 15(1) inquiry must focus on substantive equality and must consider 
all context relevant to the claim at hand. The central and sustained 
thrust of the Court’s s. 15(1) jurisprudence has been the need for a 
substantive contextual approach and a corresponding repudiation of a 
formalistic “treat likes alike” approach. … a valid s. 15(1) analysis 
must consider the full context of the claimant group’s situation and the 
actual impact of the law on that situation.120  
Koshan and Watson Hamilton, in their analysis of Withler, also 
comment on the Court’s emphasis on the actual impact of the impugned 
law on the claimants. They note that the Court reiterates this as a long-
standing principle of substantive equality.121 Hughes too, in outlining the 
“characteristics” of substantive equality, notes that “substantive equality 
                                                                                                             
113 See Koshan & Watson Hamilton, id., at 46-47 to witness the Supreme Court’s shifts on 
how to apply the contextual factors from Law. 
114 The Court in Withler, supra, note 110, for instance, mentions the importance of both 
social/legal context and effect at paras. 2, 37, 39, 40, 43 and 64. See also Kapp, supra, note 110, 
at para. 23. 
115 See Diminishing Returns, supra, note 98. 
116 Koshan & Watson Hamilton, supra, note 112. 
117 Id., at 44. 
118 See, e.g., Denise Réaume, “Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)” 
(2006) 18 C.J.W.L. 147. 
119 Koshan & Watson Hamilton, supra, note 112, at 56. 
120 Withler, supra, note 110, at para. 43 (emphasis added). 
121 Koshan & Watson Hamilton, supra, note 112, at 45. 
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requires consideration of the impact of government policy and decision 
on the various communities subject to them”122 and that substantive 
equality must be grounded in the actual experience of the oppressed.123 
Reference to section 7, which protects “life, liberty and security of 
the person”, buttresses substantive equality in the current context.124 It is 
true that the section 7 threshold is a high one. In New Brunswick (Minis-
ter of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),125 Lamer C.J.C. held 
that for a breach of the security of the person to be established by reason 
of emotional harm, it would be necessary to demonstrate “a serious and 
profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity”.126 It is clear, how-
ever, that the right to security of the person protects the individual’s 
physical and psychological integrity.127 Moreover, as Wilson J. noted in 
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),128 security 
of the person “must encompass freedom from the threat of physical pun-
ishment or suffering as well as freedom from such punishment itself”.129 
If the rights protected by section 7 themselves protect the individual both 
from harm and the threat of harm, the values underpinning section 7 
must be still more protective. Accordingly, exercising discretionary pow-
ers in accordance with Charter values in the education field requires 
sensitivity to the risk that children will be exposed to physical and psy-
chological harm by their peers and others. In view of the empirical 
evidence, introducing and carefully explaining material that normalizes 
same-sex relationships gives effect to the values underpinning section 7 
of the Charter. 
2. Legal and Social Context 
An administrative decision which implicates the equality interests of 
historically disadvantaged groups, we argue, must utilize substantive 
                                                                                                             
122 Id., at 49 (emphasis added). 
123 Id., at 46. 
124 See also New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 118 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting. 
125 Id. 
126 Id., at para. 60. 
127 See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); Canadian 
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.); Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). 
128 [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). 
129 Id., at para. 47 (emphasis added). 
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equality, underpinned by the right to be free from physical and psycho-
logical harm, as an interpretive tool in order to comply with Charter 
values. While not strictly a section 15 claim, a substantive equality 
analysis points to a purposive approach to proportional balancing under 
Doré. One purpose of the balancing act required of decision-makers in 
our scenario is to give effect, in the exercise of their statutory powers, to 
the interests of gay and lesbian parents and their children who attend 
public school, within the context of competing public attitudes about gay 
men and lesbians. In this context decision-makers must take into account 
the need to protect the children of families from sexual minorities from 
discrimination by the majority — whether this discrimination is rooted in 
secular homophobia or religious belief.  
In the larger constitutional context, religiously observant Canadians 
have already been granted a partial constitutional exemption to actions 
within public schools which run counter to their religious beliefs: their 
children have the right to attend a school where their religious rights, 
including some forms of discrimination against gays and lesbians, take 
precedence over many other constitutional guarantees.130 Private and 
publicly funded religious schools exist to support this legitimate Charter 
interest, which is protected in section 2(a). On the other hand, gays and 
lesbians do not have the option to send their children to a school that ex-
plicitly places their constitutional guarantee of equality above most other 
constitutional interests. They must rely on public and secular private 
school systems to balance the constitutional interests of all students. In 
this context, it becomes imperative that administrative decision-makers 
within this system work within their statutory mandates in order to pro-
tect children from discrimination. 
The need for curriculum reform must also be placed in the context of 
historical and contemporary homophobia, and its impact on gay and les-
bian adults and youth. For decades, homosexuality in Canada was a 
criminal offence, and gays and lesbians lost jobs, family and housing if 
their sexuality was discovered.131 Even post-criminalization in Canada, 
gays and lesbians faced overt discrimination in many aspects of their 
lives including housing and employment.132 Homosexuality was treated 
                                                                                                             
130 See Hall (Litigation guardian of) v. Powers, [2002] O.J. No. 1803, 59 O.R. (3d) 423 
(Ont. S.C.J.); TWU, supra, note 8. 
131 See Gary Kinsman & Patrizia Gentile, The Canadian War on Queers: National Security 
as Sexual Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Tom Warner, Never Going Back: A History of 
Queer Activism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) [hereinafter “Warner”]. 
132 Id. 
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as a psychiatric disorder, and a threat to national security.133 Canadian 
scholars have documented a well-established pattern of historic134 and 
contemporary135 violence against the gay and lesbian community. Until 
recently, gays and lesbians were denied the right to marry, to share bene-
fits or to adopt children.136 Homophobia and the vilification of gays and 
lesbians continue in Canadian society today.  
In the larger social and legal context, any failure to directly combat 
homophobic discrimination in a publicly funded space is anomalous and 
out of step with the legal and social gains that gays and lesbians and 
similar groups have made in Canadian society in the past decade.137 Re-
cent decisions by the Supreme Court and law reform initiatives mean that 
gays and lesbians are able to marry,138 to live in common law relation-
ships,139 to adopt140 and to procreate using artificial reproductive 
technologies.141 The number of queer families, and therefore children 
with same-sex parents, is growing.142 Ontario has recently passed a pro-
vincial law to protect children and youth who identify as belonging to a 
sexual or gender minority from bullying and discrimination.143 It is 
unlawful to discriminate in housing, employment and other publicly of-
fered services based on sexual orientation.144 Gays and lesbians (and 
their children) have a legally protected place in Canadian society, and 
access to public schools that are safe for their children must be part of 
that citizenship.145  
                                                                                                             
133 Warner, supra, note 131, at 17. 
134 See, e.g., Bruce MacDougall, Queer Judgments: Homosexuality, Expression and the 
Courts in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), at 150. 
135 See Douglas Victor Janoff, Pink Blood: Homophobic Violence in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
136 See id.; Warner, supra, note 131. 
137 Id.  
138 See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 
(S.C.C.); Bill C-38, An Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage for civil 
purposes, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (assented to July 20, 2005).  
139 Id. 
140 Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).  
141 Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in 
Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” 26:1 (2010) Can. J. Fam. L. 95. 
142 Id. 
143 Safe Schools Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 12. 
144 Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, ss. 1, 2(1), 5(1).  
145 For more on this argument, see generally Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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3. Impacts of Educational Administrative Decision-Making on 
Charter Interests 
Any infringement of religious freedom is offset first, by the choice 
available to observant parents to have their child attend a private religious 
school of their choosing where their religious views will remain largely 
unchallenged and second, within the public school context, by parental 
ability to counter equality education with religious education at home.146 
While it is true that cognitive dissonance will be one effect on the children 
of religious parents,147 the Supreme Court of Canada in Chamberlain has 
noted that a certain amount of cognitive dissonance is actually positive, 
and promotes tolerance, a key value in Canadian society: 
The number of different family models in the community means that 
some children will inevitably come from families of which certain 
parents disapprove. Giving these children an opportunity to discuss 
their family models may expose other children to some cognitive 
dissonance. But such dissonance is neither avoidable nor noxious. 
Children encounter it every day in the public school system as members 
of a diverse student body. They see their classmates, and perhaps also 
their teachers, eating foods at lunch that they themselves are not 
permitted to eat, whether because of their parents’ religious strictures or 
because of other moral beliefs. They see their classmates wearing 
clothing with features or brand labels which their parents have 
forbidden them to wear. And they see their classmates engaging in 
behaviour on the playground that their parents have told them not to 
engage in. The cognitive dissonance that results from such encounters 
is simply a part of living in a diverse society. It is also a part of growing 
up. Through such experiences, children come to realize that not all of 
their values are shared by others.  
Exposure to some cognitive dissonance is arguably necessary if 
children are to be taught what tolerance itself involves. As my 
colleague points out, the demand for tolerance cannot be interpreted as 
the demand to approve of another person’s beliefs or practices. When 
we ask people to be tolerant of others, we do not ask them to abandon 
their personal convictions. We merely ask them to respect the rights, 
                                                                                                             
146 Same-sex parents engage in such counter-education constantly with their children to 
counteract homophobic messages in school and society generally. See generally Rachel Epstein, ed., 
Who’s Your Daddy and Other Writings in Queer Parenting (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2009), c. 4-5ff. 
147 “The argument based on cognitive dissonance essentially asserts that children should not be 
exposed to information and ideas with which their parents disagree” (Chamberlain, supra, note 28, 
at para. 64). 
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values and ways of being of those who may not share those 
convictions. The belief that others are entitled to equal respect depends, 
not on the belief that their values are right, but on the belief that they 
have a claim to equal respect regardless of whether they are right. 
Learning about tolerance is therefore learning that other people’s 
entitlement to respect from us does not depend on whether their views 
accord with our own. Children cannot learn this unless they are 
exposed to views that differ from those they are taught at home.148 
As has been amply demonstrated,149 the children of gay and lesbian par-
ents who experience homophobia at school, on the other hand, suffer 
increased rates of depression, anxiety and higher rates of suicidal idea-
tion and suicide. 
A post-Doré analysis must engage in a proportional weighing of the 
competing values, within the legal and social context of Canadian 
society. Taking seriously the value of substantive equality analysis calls 
for administrative decision-making that gives meaning to a law or 
policy for marginalized groups. Education actors should lean in favour 
of protecting the vulnerable from the measurably more serious impact 
upon them. 
V. EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS IN THE  
EDUCATION CONTEXT 
It flows from our argument up to this point that in exercising their 
powers — from policy initiatives at the ministerial level, to the refining 
and implementation of those initiatives and other measures of control at 
the school board level, to their ultimate implementation by principals and 
teachers — administrative actors in education must use Charter values as 
their touchstones.150 Where they fail to do so, substantive equality claims 
                                                                                                             
148 Id., at paras. 65-66. 
149 See Part II.3, above, for more on this topic. 
150 Evidently, Charter values will have to be applied in different contexts, giving rise to the 
possibility of disagreement. An interesting question may occasionally arise: how to regulate 
situations in which decision-makers disagree with each other about the application of Charter values. 
Here, we refer to the developing jurisprudence on standards of review within administrative 
decision-making structures. Attention to the text, purposes and context of the relevant legislation 
will be necessary to identify the appropriate relationship between decision-makers. For example, it 
will not necessarily always be the case that a decision-maker higher up the chain will be able to 
make a de novo decision which takes no account of decisions taken by front-line decision-makers. 
See, e.g., Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] A.J. No. 1463, 38 Alta. L.R. (5th) 63, 
at para. 43 (Alta. C.A.). 
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can be advanced by way of judicial review in the five ways identified in 
Part III. Our focus in what follows is on the regime created by Ontario’s 
Education Act, but it can equally be applied to the decision-making 
structures in the other provinces and the territories. Our more particular 
focus — compelled by our discussion of the empirical evidence — is on 
powers in relation to curriculum setting and control of bullying. 
1. Role of the Minister, School Boards, Principals and Teachers 
At the head of Ontario’s education superstructure is the Minister of 
Education. As one would expect, the Education Act vests broad policy-
making authority in the Minister. Section 8.3 provides, in respect of 
curriculum, for example, that the Minister may “issue curriculum 
guidelines and require that courses of study be developed therefrom” 
and “prescribe areas of study”. In addition, section 8.6 allows the 
Minister to “select and approve for use in schools textbooks, library 
books, reference books and other learning materials”.151 In respect of 
bullying, section 301(1) permits the Minister to “establish a code of 
conduct governing the behaviour of all persons in schools”; one of the 
purposes of such a code of conduct is, pursuant to section 301(2)7, “[t]o 
prevent bullying in schools”.  
School boards are to “promote student achievement and well-being”, 
“promote a positive school climate that is inclusive and accepting of all 
pupils, including pupils of any race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, eth-
nic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability” and 
“promote the prevention of bullying”.152 They are required, moreover, to 
“establish and provide annual professional development programs to 
educate teachers and other staff of the board about bullying prevention 
and strategies for promoting positive school climates”153 and to “provide 
programs, interventions or other supports for pupils who have been bul-
lied, pupils who have witnessed incidents of bullying and pupils who 
have engaged in bullying”.154  
                                                                                                             
151 Although this power is delegated to individual School Boards. See note 21, supra. 
152 Education Act, supra, note 18, s. 169.1(1)(a). 
153 Id., s 170(1)7.1. 
154 Id., s. 170(1)7.2. 
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Principals have the responsibility “to maintain proper order and dis-
cipline in the school”.155 In cases of bullying, they are required to 
consider suspending the offending pupil,156 and, in cases where harass-
ment was based on the other pupil’s sexual orientation, this must be 
taken into consideration.157 They must also “give assiduous attention to 
the health and comfort of the pupils”.158 In addition they may be re-
quired, by a School Board or (indirectly) by the Minister, to establish a 
“local code of conduct” in respect of bullying which is consistent with 
any provincial code of conduct in place.159 
For their part, teachers must “maintain, under the direction of the 
principal, proper order and discipline in the teacher’s classroom and 
while on duty in the school and on the school ground”.160 They must also 
“encourage the pupils in the pursuit of learning”161 and “inculcate by 
precept and example respect for religion and the principles of Judaeo-
Christian morality and the highest regard for truth, justice, loyalty, love 
of country, humanity, benevolence, sobriety, industry, frugality, purity, 
temperance and all other virtues”.162 This is language “of another era”, 
which should not be taken in modern times as privileging one world 
view, but which emphasizes the “idealistically high” expectations of  
today’s teachers.163 
Taking a step back and looking at the forest rather than the individual 
trees, it is clear that the Minister (acting for the most part through or with 
the help of civil servants) and school boards have a crucial role in the 
development of curricula and bullying policies. Principals and teachers 
play a subordinate — though no less important — role in implementing 
ministerial and school-board policies and in discharging the state’s duty 
to educate. Powers in relation to the curriculum can evidently be used to 
shape young minds. So too can powers in relation to discipline, which 
permit educators not only to demonstrate to malefactors the error of their 
ways but also to point towards better paths. 
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156 Education Act, supra, note 18, s. 306(1). 
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As we have explained, the powers granted for the furtherance of the 
functions we have outlined should be exercised in conformity with the 
values underpinning sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, especially in 
deciding what to put on the curriculum, how to teach it, what materials to 
employ, and how to prevent and respond to bullying, as a general 
phenomenon and in its individual manifestations. In particular, attention 
should be paid to the need to protect children from harm and to expose 
them to the realities of life and diverse family arrangements in modern 
Canada. Indeed, a proper appreciation of the Charter values which form 
the backdrop to the exercise of powers in the field of education reveals 
the importance of normalizing relationships that do not resemble the 
traditional nuclear family and protecting those who suffer prejudice due 
to perceived deviation from dominant norms. Exposure to difference and 
the nurturing of equality allow educators to play their part in shaping a 
society in which children are not singled out on the basis of their 
characteristics or those of their family members. The overwhelming 
evidence of the physical and psychological harm that result from 
homophobic and other forms of bullying should be an important 
consideration for educators from the classroom up to the Ministry of 
Education.  
Failure to take these considerations and evidence into account should 
be considered an error on the part of the Minister, school boards, 
principals and teachers. But it also opens up the possibility of judicial 
review, to advance claims for substantive equality in the five areas 
identified in Part III. Within the administrative process itself, when 
arguing or advocating before the Minister, a school board, a principal or 
a teacher, the importance of Charter values should be emphasized by 
those who find themselves on the front line of administrative decision-
making. As we noted above, administration, in the education field as in 
any other, is at heart a human endeavour that requires appeal to decision-
makers’ moral cores. Infused with the values underpinning sections 7 and 
15 of the Charter, those appeals should move decision-makers’ minds. 
2. Charter Values and Education in Ontario: A Return to Our 
Fictional Example 
To return to our fictional example, the School Board should allow S to 
introduce these materials into her classroom. In balancing the effects of the 
decision on the children of GLBTQ parents against the effects on other 
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children in the classroom, we argue that combatting the devastating effects 
of homophobia must take precedence in the public school setting. 
A substantive equality approach would take into account the ameliorative 
effect of the curriculum in protecting against discrimination, as well as its 
role in educating all Canadian children about the (legally protected) diversity 
of families in their communities. The decision must also be taken against the 
contextual backdrop of Canadian society, where GLBTQ parents and youth 
have full legal rights, yet are still the subject of homophobic violence and 
discrimination. To exclude GLBTQ families and individuals from the public 
school curriculum, while simultaneously emphasizing other kinds of 
diversity (cultural diversity, for example), sends a not-so-subtle message to 
children and youth about whose families are valued, and whose families are 
to be ignored. Rendering these families and individuals invisible in official 
discourse risks normalizing homophobic and transphobic reactions to 
encountering this kind of difference.  
That is not to say that the children of religiously observant parents 
should be sidelined. The Ontario curriculum clearly makes a place within 
public schools to celebrate diverse families’ cultural and religious tradi-
tions. In circumstances where religious and cultural views diverge 
between families on important topics, teachers frequently find creative 
and harmonious ways to acknowledge both without denigrating either. A 
good example is the celebration in public schools of various religious 
and/or cultural festivals, even where the basic tenets or morals of these 
religions/cultures may diverge in important ways. A similar approach can 
be taken in this instance, acknowledging and celebrating children from 
diverse families, while simultaneously creating teaching moments about 
differences in opinion, and equality in difference. As McLachlin C.J.C. 
pointed out in Chamberlain, cognitive dissonance, learning about differ-
ence from our peers, and managing conflict are important skills to teach 
all young Canadians. 
Beyond our fictional example, leaving the decision to include or 
exclude GLBTQ families and individuals to individual teachers, 
principals or school boards is not, we argue, sufficient to meet basic 
standards of substantive equality in the education system. The Accepting 
Schools Act, 2012164 was a huge step in the right direction for protecting 
youth who are experiencing homophobic and transphobic bullying. This 
Act allows educational decision-makers to deal with persistent, 
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individual bullies with progressive discipline on a case-by-case basis. 
Like the piecemeal curriculum introduction from our fictional example, 
this is an important but inadequate approach to systemic homophobia and 
transphobia. Significantly, the Act also mandates gay-straight alliances in 
any public school where students want them. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the presence of these student-led initiatives greatly 
improves the school environment for GLBTQ youth. Both anti-bullying 
legislation and gay-straight alliances are clearly steps that take 
substantive equality for GLBTQ students, or students with GLBTQ 
family members, into account. 
We suggest three additional steps. First, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that introducing a normalizing and GLBTQ-positive curriculum has 
the potential to profoundly change school environments in positive ways, 
reducing the need for individual disciplinary measures. Ontario’s public 
school curriculum already includes mandated coverage of cultural differ-
ence, and the policy framework for adding further curriculum diversity is 
in place. Since 2009, in Realizing the Promise of Diversity: Ontario’s 
Equity and Inclusive Education Strategy,165 the Ontario Minister of Edu-
cation has sought to actively address substantive equality in our public 
education system, including equality for GLBTQ stakeholders in the 
education system. We recommend that, alongside cultural diversity, the 
Ontario curriculum include sexual and gender minorities in existing cur-
riculum. For example, in Grade 2, where students are taught about 
diverse family traditions, celebrations and structures, the curriculum 
should further specify that this should include, for example, depictions of 
same-sex families or families with a transgendered parent. As with cul-
tural and structural diversity (lone parents, step-parents, etc.), the aim is 
not to valorize one family model over another, but to introduce the exis-
tence of diverse families, and the important notion that they all deserve 
respect and protection from discrimination. In exercising his powers over 
the curriculum, the Minister should give due weight to the values under-
pinning sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. 
Second, the current Education Act contains little guidance on how 
decision-makers should balance competing constitutional rights. 
Introducing specific language that speaks to Charter values, substantive 
equality, or even more specifically the equality rights of GLBTQ 
students, or students with GLBTQ family members, alongside other 
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rights holders would give administrative decision-makers guidance as to 
the kinds of factors that must be weighed in making decisions on a day-
to-day basis. Currently the Education Act, unlike British Columbia’s 
education legislation, for example,166 does not include any guidance on 
how to balance equality and religious rights in the public school context. 
Third, there is of course a limit to what can be done through legisla-
tion and administrative decision-making. What is necessary is sensitivity 
on the part of civil servants, school boards, principals and teachers to 
difference and the need for equality. Adopting a province-wide program 
to nourish education actors’ appreciation of substantive equality and the 
right to be free from harm would help to bring administrative decision-
making into line with the Court’s edicts in Doré. After all, civil servants, 
school boards, principals and teachers are often the first and last lines of 
defence of Charter values.  
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